Macroeconomic effects of the Barcelona Initiative by Lucke, B. & Zotti, Jacopo
Assessing the Macroeconomic Effects of the Barcelona 
Initiative 
 
 
Bernd Lucke1 
University of Hamburg  
 
 
Jacopo Zotti2 
University of Hamburg  
 
October 2012 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper compares ex post and ex ante assessments of the macroeconomic effects of 
trade liberalization in the Mediterranean. Using implications from a standard Ramsey growth 
model augmented for anticipation and implementation effects, we pool cross section and 
time series data to estimate ex post the effects of trade liberalization on a set of arabic 
Southern Mediterranean Partner countries (SMPCs). We find significant and robust evidence 
for positive effects on major macro variables and discuss the appropriate policies. Second, 
we review a number of computable general equilibrium (CGE) studies which aimed at 
assessing the macroeconomic impacts for the same countries ex ante. CGE projections are 
very much at odds with the econometric findings and the biases seem to be systematic for all 
macro variables. Third, we use ANOVA techniques to identify possible shortcomings both 
with respect to design and target country of the CGE study. We find that even well-designed 
CGE studies targeted to an average type of country do not seem to yield reliable results. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that there is no sound statistical evidence to believe that CGE 
analysis has been useful in assessing the macroeconomic effects of trade liberalization in the 
Mediterranean. But we find considerable econometric evidence to support the view that free 
trade policies have enhanced growth in the MENA region. 
 
Keywords: Barcelona Initiative, free trade agreement, CGE models 
 
JEL: F14, C51, O24 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author. Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany. email: 
lucke@econ.uni-hamburg.de. This is an updated and extended version of previous research by Lucke and 
Nathanson (2007). 
2 Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, D-20146 Hamburg, Germany. email: Jacopo.Zotti@wiso.uni-
hamburg.de  
 1
1. Introduction  
Recent unrest and political instability in arabic states has re-alerted European policy 
makers to the threat of uncontrolled immigration from its southern neighboring region. But the 
European Union (EU) is not as unprepared as it may seem, for it has, in the last 15 years, 
spent considerable effort on promoting economic integration and development in the Middle-
East and North-Africa (MENA). Nevertheless, there is a widespread perception that this 
region is slow in responding and adjusting to globalization, cf. World Bank (2003).  
The MENA region is a large developing market with more than 400 million customers 
(about the size of the EU27). Therefore, the EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
aimed at strengthening economic and political ties between the Common Market and MENA. 
A cornerstone of this so-called Barcelona Initiative (BI) was the gradual creation of a free 
trade area for industrial products between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners. In the 
following years, the EU negotiated bilateral Association Agreements (AA) with each partner 
country, typically allowing for a twelve-year transition phase of tariff and non-tariff barrier 
dismantling. 
The effects of such preferential trade liberalization need not be mutually benefitial due 
to the possibility of harmful trade diversion effects. In the late 1990s and early 2000s a wave 
of applied economic research in Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling was 
directed at assessing this issue from an ex ante perspective. A more recent CGE approach is 
Elshennawy (2012)1 
By 2011, the Barcelona Initiative has been pushed on further into a “Union for the 
Mediterranean”. But few academic studies exist which provide quantitative assessments of 
what has been achieved so far2. Nor has much attention been devoted to how well today’s 
experience is in line with the ex-ante projection of CGE studies. 
Of the few retrospective studies which exist, the most notable ones estimate gravity 
equations to test for a significant impact of trade liberalization on exports or imports. Peridy 
(2005, 2006) finds beneficial effects of lower EU tariffs on Mediterranean countries’ exports. 
However, most of this tariff dismantling took place in the 1970s prior to the BI. Söderling 
(2005) explicitly studies the effects of the first AAs and finds that some MENA countries’ 
exports seem to have benefited while others have not. Hagemejer and Cieslik (2009) 
conclude that imports of MENA countries have clearly increased while there is no significant 
effect of BI-induced trade liberalization on exports. 
                                                 
1 Lim and Saborowsky (2010) do a similar exercise in the World Bank’s partial equilibrium TRIST model. 
2 In fact, the final report of a EU-sponsored impact assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
project (SIA-EMFTA (2007)) relies completely on the old ex-ante projections. (The authors take care to point out 
that they assess only the “potential magnitude of economic ... impacts” (our emphasis).) 
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Unfortunately, the welfare implications of these results are far from clear. The 
economic well-being of MENA populations does not primarily hinge on foreign trade but on 
income (GDP), consumption, and investment (as a proxy for future consumption 
possibilities). Thus, 15 years after the launch of the BI little is known about whether its key 
element, unilateral trade liberalization, has made the MENA countries better or worse off. 
This question is of immediate policy relevance and it is the first to be addressed in this paper. 
Econometric methods evaluate the macro impacts ex-post while the CGE exercises of 
the 1990s provided ex-ante evaluations of the BI’s macroeconomic effects. Our study seems 
to be the first which aims at a serious comparison between these results3. But CGE-based 
claims should, according to good scientific practice, be falsifiable. Surprisingly, however, 
CGE-analyses have flourished for decades without much econometric review. Filling this gap 
is the second issue addressed in this paper. 
Since some countries have not yet completed tariff dismantling, we focus our analysis 
on the semi-elasticity of macro variables with respect to tariff rates. This magnitude can be 
estimated econometrically while trade liberalization is still under way, and it is also readily 
computed from CGE studies. Comparing projected and realized effects of trade liberalization 
then permits inference on the reliability of CGE models4.  
The sequel of the paper is structured as follows: 
In section II we introduce a theoretical model which explicitly distinguishes between 
anticipation and implementation effects of trade liberalization. We use this to derive the 
appropriate specification of our regression analysis. We discuss the data in section III. In 
section IV we apply dynamic panel estimators to our data set and find significant and robust 
evidence for positive effects on major macro variables. In section V, we review CGE studies 
and compute semi-elasticities for ready comparison with the econometric results. We find 
that CGE projections are very much at odds with the econometric findings. Hence, we use 
ANOVA techniques to identify possible shortcomings both with respect to design and target 
country of the CGE study. Controlling for these, we conclude that even well-designed CGE 
studies are unlikely to yield reliable and, hence, useful results.  
 
                                                 
3 Hess (2005) presents a meta-study with a similar intent for CGE studies of Doha round effects.  
4 Our investigation focuses exclusively on the macro implications of CGE research. A great value of CGE models 
may lie in their potential to simulate highly disaggregated sectors of the economy. We do not evaluate the 
success of CGE models along these lines since the focus of the CGE-based research on the BI was clearly on 
aggregate variables. However, the macro effects were implied by simulations of disaggregated production 
sectors. Hence, if the macro projections are found to be problematic, this must have its origins in the underlying 
simulation results for the disaggregated economy.  
 
 3
2. Deriving the regression equation 
Trade liberalization did not come unexpected for consumers and investors in SMPCs. 
Tariff dismantling was announced long before it was implemented. We start by specifying a 
theoretical model which takes this kind of informational structure into account. Unlike the 
related literature which emphasizes the importance of news in DSGE models (cf. Beaudry 
and Portier (2006), Beaudry and Lucke (2010)), we focus exclusively on a deterministic 
setting. Future tariff rates are known with certainty from a precise schedule of tariff 
dismantling as laid out in the Association Agreements (AA) with the EU. 
Which implications do news about future tariff liberalization have for the specification of 
a proper regression equation? In the Web-appendix5. to this paper we use a standard 
Ramsey-type growth model to argue that dynamic optimization implies the existence of two 
jumps in consumption (and other controls) in response to changes in (trade) policy: Hence, 
observed changes in consumption at time t may either be explained by perceived future tariff 
changes (the announcement effect) or by simultaneous or lagged actual tariff changes (the 
implementation effect)6. We know of no econometric study in this context which takes this 
theoretical insight into account. Most CGE-analyses do also not model anticipation effects of 
changes in tariff policy7.  
To derive the regression equation formally, imagine an economy in which some 
imported consumption goods are subject to taxes. Such import taxes raise the price of the 
aggregate consumption bundle so that the consumer price of aggregate (per capita) 
consumption c  is given by 1  , where   is an appropriately weighted function of the 
import tariffs. Assuming that investment goods are not subject to tariffs, the condition for 
optimality is typically a standard Ramsey rule such as  1c r c   , where   is the time 
discount rate and 1   is the elasticity of substitution. As long as   is constant, c  will be 
independent of the tariff rate. However, if tariff rate changes are announced and 
implemented at different points in time, consumption growth will exhibit two discontinuities 
over time. Hence a properly specified regression equation has to include one measure of 
anticipated and one measure of actual (or lagged) tariff rates.  
 0ln ... , 0, 0t l t l f t f tc u l f              (1) 
Moreover, the Ramsey rule implies that a measure of the real interest rate is required. 
Since this is hard to obtain in applied work for developing countries, we use the neoclassical 
assumption that the marginal product of capital is a decreasing function of capital, i. e. 
                                                 
5 http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/lucke-and-zotti 
6 In the theoretical model the implementation effect implies an instantaneous response of consumption to the 
change in the tariff rate. Realistically, we will also allow for lagged responses in the empirical analysis.  
7 Notable exceptions are Gaitan and Lucke (2007), Lucke, Zotti and Gaitan (2006) and Lucke and Zotti (2007).  
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  , ' 0r r k r  . In line with standard results we also assume that the policy function for 
consumption is strictly increasing in k ,   , ' 0c c k c  . We can therefore invert the policy 
function and express r  as a function of c . Thus, rather than using the real interest rate in the 
regression equation we include c  as an additional regressor on the right hand side of (1) – 
with the expectation of a negative coefficient. Other macroeconomic aggregates like output 
and investment typically follow similar dynamics.  
Finally, we add conditioning variables to capture other changes in the economic 
environment implicitly assumed constant in the Ramsey model. Hence, for a given 
endogenous variable z and additional conditioning variables kx , the general form of the 
regression equation is  
 0 1 1ln ln , 0, 0t t l t l f t f k k tz z x u l f                . (2) 
Since future variables as regressors are unconventional in regression analysis, we note 
that, under an Association Agreement, the future tariff rate is a variable which is already fixed 
today in a binding contract. Thus, the future rate is a nonstochastic anticipation of future tariff 
rates. One contribution of our paper is that the design of (2) enables us to explicitly test for 
the existence of announcement effects. 
 
 
 
3. Data 
For southern Mediterranean countries, national accounts data is available only at the 
annual frequency. To obtain a reasonably sized sample which may allow for valid inference 
even in the face of noisy data we pool cross section and time series data of seven Arabic 
countries, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunesia. We generally use 
all available data for the analysis, i. e. we typically work with unbalanced panels8. To be able 
to single out the BI-effects, we include some pre-Barcelona observations by letting the 
sample run from 1992 to the most recent observation (usually 2008). 
For all countries, we use the following data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI): Gross domestic product (lny), household final consumption expenditure 
(lnc), general government final consumption expenditure (lng), gross fixed capital formation 
(lninv), exports (lnexp) and imports (lnim) of goods in services, all in constant prices and local 
currency units, logged and per capita. We also use the growth rate of population ( dlnpop ), 
the (consumer price) annual inflation rate (inf), the growth rate of the average official 
                                                 
8 We occasionally refer to the data set as a panel although its structure is atypical in the sense that the time 
dimension is greater than the cross section dimension. 
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exchange rate per US$ (dlner), and net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, (fdi). Crude oil 
prices (lnpoil) (medium, Fateh 32 API, fob Dubai) are taken from the IMF’s primary 
commodity price data base. This regressor is padded with zeros for countries which do not 
export (much) oil (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon)9. 
Aggregate tariff rates can be computed as weighted or as unweighted means. The 
World Bank publishes estimates of tariff rates (calculated as unweighted means)10. We use 
linear interpolation if not more than two observations are missing and the reported values 
before and after the missings are relatively close. Otherwise, e. g. Syria 1992-1995, we keep 
the missings. We denote the resulting variable by tuw. As an alternative measure of tariff 
rates we computed the weighted average of tariff rates and denote this by tw. For this 
purpose we use information on tariff revenues provided by the IMF and (in some cases) 
national statistical offices and divided by nominal imports. 
Neither measure includes non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Nor does a measure of the tariff 
rate capture accompanying economic and institutional reforms which were clearly on the 
agenda of the Barcelona Initiative. But it is very likely that a country which embraces the 
Barcelona Initiative seeks to implement its objectives through a multifaceted reform process. 
The observable reduction in formal tariff barriers may well be correlated with reductions of 
NTBs, market-oriented economic reforms or efficiency-enhancing institutional change. 
Hence, the regressors tuw and tw should be interpreted as catchalls for variables which are 
difficult to measure but possibly equally important for the success of the Barcelona Initiative. 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
Equation (2) is a dynamic equation – the lagged dependent variable is among the set 
of regressors. As is well known, standard fixed or random effects estimators are inconsistent 
in this context. The widely used Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator (AB), however, is consistent, 
irrespective of whether individual effects are fixed or random. This estimator uses a dynamic 
set of intruments applied to the first difference of the regression equation. It eliminates the 
individual effects which cause the asymptotic bias. 
We will first consider real GDP per capita, i. e. lny. Panel unit root tests (not reported 
here) give conflicting results about the validity of the unit root null. We therefore use the 
framework proposed by Bhargava (1986) which nests a trend-stationary and a unit root with 
                                                 
9 More details on data are found in the discussion paper version of this article. All data are available upon request  
10 See World Bank (2006). 
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drift model. Bhargava’s formulation is conveniently nested in (2) by including a linear time 
trend t among the conditioning variables kx . 
It is not clear from theoretical grounds if weighted or unweighted averages of tariff rates 
should be used. Both measures have certain disadvantages, cf. Anderson and Neary (2005). 
Generally, unweighted averages place more weight on high tariff rates and may therefore 
capture the stimulus of tariff dismantling better than weighted rates. We start our analysis 
with the former, but note that switching to weighted means makes generally makes no 
notable difference. 
 Due to the rather limited amount of observations we use a specific-to-general 
approach estimating the restricted equation11  
 0 1 1it i it l it l K itlny lny tuw t u          (3) 
for various leads and lags of tuw. Here, i denotes country i and 0l   allows lagged 
responses to implemented tariff rate changes. We initially neglect the announcement effect 
and conditioning regressors to which we turn later. Rather we focus on the correct lag 
specification for the implementation effect. AB-estimation of (3) for 0 4l   indicates that 
tuw is significant only for 2l  . Moreover, a second lag of the endogenous variable is 
significant12. To check robustness, we also estimate the equation using simple OLS and GLS 
estimators with fixed or random effects and obtain precisely the same finding. Detailed 
results are suppressed to save space, but are available upon request.  
AB-estimators use dynamic instruments, i. e. the set of instruments varies with time. 
We generally instrument a lagged dependent variable by its own past starting in 2t   while 
we instrument 2ittuw   by itself. Similarly, exogenous variables will be instrumented by 
themselves. As Table 1 shows, different choices of the set of dynamic instruments lead to 
similar conclusions: All regressors are highly significant, the sum of the coefficients of the 
lagged endogenous regressors is much smaller than 1 (indicating  -convergence), and, in 
particular, the semi-elasticity of the lagged tariff rate is roughly 0.2. We can interpret this 
result as saying that a decrease in the tariff rate by one percentage point has a positive 
impact on the level of real per capita GDP of 0.2 percent. Hence, as is familiar from standard 
growth theory, a change in a policy parameter has a permanent level effect, but only a 
temporary effect on the growth rate. 
The specification in the third column of Table 1 is our preferred specification, as here 
the standard error of the regression and the standard error of 2ittuw   are minimal. Morover 
                                                 
11 Note that (3) is equivalent to regressing the growth rate of real GDP per capita on its lagged level, i. e. (3) is a 
typical growth regression. 
12 Throughout the analysis, we apply a significance level of 5%. 
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the point estimate of 2  is close to the mean estimate of this coefficient across all columns 
and the specification passes Sargan’s test. Note that there are no generally accepted 
measures of fits for equations estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
 
Table 1 
Arellano-Bond GMM results for (3) with 2l   
 dynamic instruments start at lag 2 and end at  
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0.477 0.463 0.402 0.497 0.442 0.487 0.417 0.367 0.470 
1itlny   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.026 
0.282 0.258 0.299 0.314 0.302 0.389 0.279 0.290 0.344 
2itlny   0.002 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.001 0.097 
-0.175 -0.166 -0.204 -0.211 -0.299 -0.253 -0.217 -0.242 -0.240 
2ittuw   0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.004 T 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.059 0.025 0.025 0.052 
ˆ  0.036 0.036 0.035 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.036 
Sargan 
P-value 0.040 0.029 0.213 0.658 0.459 0.417 0.030 0.141 0.487 
Bold: Regression coefficients significant at 5% level. Italics: P-values.   
 
We now amend the benchmark specification by further conditioning variables. We 
report here only those variables which were to some extent significant, but we note that we 
have also (with negative results) tested indicators of exchange rates, inflation, and FDI as 
well as interactions of these variables with country dummies.  
We begin with the oil price lnpoil as an additional explanatory variable for real per 
capita GDP in Algeria, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. It turns out that contemporaneous oil 
prices are insignificant, while oil prices lagged one or two years are significant with almost 
the same (positive) coefficient. We prefer the specification with lag 2, because this regressor 
has more explanatory power when lag 1 and lag 2 are used jointly. See columns (1) to (4) of 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: 
Arellano-Bond GMM results: Conditioning variables  
 Dependent variable: itlny  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.365 0.330 0.331 0.328 0.342 0.383 0.389 
1itlny   0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.291 0.262 0.260 0.249 0.313 0.194 0.246 
2itlny   0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.025 0.003 
-0.167 -0.156 -0.179 -0.171 -0.195 -0.149 -0.170 
2ittuw   0.002 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 
0.017       
tlnpoil  0.272       
 0.039  0.011    
1tlnpoil    0.013  0.511    
  0.038 0.032 0.041 0.034 0.037 
2tlnpoil     0.016 0.072 0.005 0.021 0.011 
    -1.215   
itdlnpop      0.030   
     1.151  
1itdlnpop        0.011  
      -0.994 
itdlnpop        0.002 
0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.008 T 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ˆ  0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.031 
Bold: Regression coefficients significant at 5% level. Italics: P-values. 
 
We proceed to test whether the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate dlner, 
the inflation rate inf or foreign direct investment fdi are suitable conditioning variables which 
might either explain the growth experience of real per capita GDP or capture cross-sectional 
heterogeneity. For all these variables, we test for both a contemporaneous and a lagged 
influence up to two lags. We suppress the results here, since none of these regressors is 
significant.  
Moreover, we amend the equation by the population growth rate dlnpop. This regressor 
turns out to be significant both contemporaneously and with a lag of one year. Since the 
estimated coefficients have opposite sign but nearly equal magnitude, we replace the growth 
rates by the contemporaneous change in the population growth rate dlnpop and find that 
this regressor is highly significant with a coefficient of almost -1 and minimal standard error of 
estimate for all tested specifications, cf. columns (5) to (7) of Table 2. Column (7) becomes 
our new benchmark specification. 
So far, we have focused on the implementation effect as measured by lags of the 
unweighted aggregate tariff rate tuw. (Very similar results obtain if we use lags of the 
weighted tariff rate tw.) We have, however, not yet accounted for the announcement effect 
emphasized in the theoretical section. This effect is due to forward looking behavior of 
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individuals, and each individual will find future tariff dismantling important to the degree at 
which he or she will trade at the lower tariff rates. Thus, the weighted tariff rate tw seems 
appropriate to capture the announcement effect13. 
Regression results for the benchmark equation plus future tariff rates at various lags 
are given in Table 3.  
Table 3: 
Arellano-Bond GMM results: Announcement effects  
 Dependent variable: itlny  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.709 0.779 0.798 0.605 
1itlny   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.105 -0.103 -0.209 -0.144 
2ittuw   0.004 0.017 0.000 0.001 
-0.459   -0.390 
1ittw   0.000   0.006 
 -0.506  -0.097 
2ittw    0.006  0.599 
  -0.388 0.015 
3ittw     0.018 0.924 
-1.203 -1.343 -1.411 -1.140 
itdlnpop  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005 T 0.024 0.320 0.305 0.011 
ˆ  0.023 0.026 0.025 0.022 
Bold: Regression coefficients significant at 5% level. Italics: P-
values.  
 
Clearly, tariff rates perceived to prevail in the future significantly influence today’s real 
GDP per capita. This effect is almost independent of the implementation effect, since the 
coefficient of lagged tuw continues to be highly significant, albeit possibly with a slightly 
reduced semi-elasticity. But while the implementation effect is rather weak (semi-elasticity of 
approx. 0.1-0.2), the announcement effect is much stronger (semi-elasticity of 0.4-0.5). 
Future tariff rates are significant up to a lead of three years, but the underlying effects are 
clearly not orthogonal to each other, as column (4) of Table 3 shows. In fact, it seems that 
the announcement effect is well captured by a lead of one year as in column (1).  
This underlines the importance of a credibly announced policy for the planning 
behavior of economic agents. The future tariff rate is inidicative of tariff policy over a long 
period of time, probably exceeding the the twelve-year horizon of the AAs. Our results say 
                                                 
13 Note that the weights are endogenous. We take this into account by instrumenting future weighted tariff tw rates 
by lagged unweighted tariff rates tuw (at least a lag of two periods relative to the dependent variable). Hence, the 
GMM estimate is consistent.   
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that this perspective stimulates economic activity more than a low tariff rate in any single 
year.  
We now turn to the question by which channels lower protection stimulates real per 
capita GDP. For this purpose, we run the same type of regression for components of GDP 
(consumption, investment, government expenditure and imports14) and for foreign direct 
investment. All of these variables may be affected by decreased tariff barriers, because 
imported goods become cheaper, because economic prospects open up or – in the case of 
the government - because revenues fall. Hence they may function as transmission channels 
through which the effects of tariff rate reductions on GDP operate. 
A summary of the results is given in Table 4. We set out with an regression equation 
containing all the regressors in the first column of this table and then delete the insignificant 
variables. Government consumption, column (3), is not significantly affected by tariff 
dismantling, thus it seems that the loss in revenues (which can be significant in SMPCs) was 
offset by either increased tax revenue elsewhere or by higher net borrowing but not by 
reduced expenditure.  
Table 4: 
Arellano-Bond GMM results for FDI and components of GDP  
 Endogenous variable:  
 
itlnc  
(1) 
itlninv  
(2) 
itlng  
(3) 
itlnimp  
(4) 
itfdi  
(5) 
0.583 0.670 0.517 0.474 0.326 
1itend. var   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 
 -0.241 -0.193   
2itend. var    0.019 0.003   
-0.278 -0.516  -0.293  
2ittuw   0.001 0.001  0.030  
-0.974 -1.387   -0.258 
1ittw   0.000 0.000   0.001 
0.059   0.148  
2tlnpoil   0.048   0.000  
-2.181 -3.526    
itdlnpop  0.000 0.000    
  0.013 0.017  T   0.000 0.000  
ˆ  0.048 0.098 0.042 0.087  
Bold: Regression coefficients significant at 5% level. Italics: P-values. 
 
Imports, column (4), are stimulated by implemented tariff rates decreases, but show no 
significant repsonse to announcements. The positive impact of the lagged oil price is 
probably due to a positive income effect from higher oil prices and the same interpretation 
applies, although only very weakly, to the consumption equation, column (1). Consumption 
                                                 
14 We do not emphasize exports here since conditions for exporters have hardly changed under the BI. We just 
note that analogous regressions for exports do not deliver significant results with respect to tariff rates. 
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and investment, column (2), respond positively to both announced and implemented tariff 
rate decreases. The semi-elasticities are clearly larger for investment. This suggests that 
there is a fairly strong supply-side reaction to actual and anticipated increases in competition. 
From column (5) we learn that net inflows of foreign direct investment respond positively to 
announced tariff rate decreases only. The fact that implemented tariff rate decreases are not 
significant in this equation reinforces the view that FDI is a forward-looking variable.  
Summing up, we have derived regression equations for real per capita GDP, 
consumption, investment, government absorption and imports. These equations are similar 
to standard growth regressions with particular emphasis on tariff rates as a catchall for trade 
liberalization and accompanying economic reforms. The regression coefficients for the tariff 
rates are semi-elasticities computed ex post. It is interesting to compare these to semi-
elasticities which were computed ex ante by using CGE models.  
It is important to note that the ex-post estimates of the semi-elasticities are short-run 
elasticities, since the regression equations contain lagged endogenous variables. This 
matches well with the overwhelmingly static (i. e. short-run) CGE-studies which have tried to 
assess the effects of the BI ex ante15.  
Many CGE studies analyse the effect of trade liberalization on output under the 
counterfactual assumption that government absorption and possibly also investment stay 
constant16. In this case we need to use ex-post semi-elasticities which were estimated in a 
regression controlling for the level of the variables held constant in the CGE model. We have 
therefore reestimated the benchmark specification for log output (Table 3, column (1)) with 
either contemporaneous government absorption or also contemporaneous investment as 
additional regressor. We instrumented with the same variables lagged two periods. In both 
cases these regressors are clearly insignificant and the point estimates of the tariff rates 
hardly change. Hence, for output there is no need to distinguish semi-elasticities of tariff 
rates with respect to these type of control variables.17   
But CGE studies often also derive projections for other variables like consumption, 
investment, and imports. To account for assumptions of constant government absorption or 
constant investment we therefore reestimate the specifications in columns (1), (2) and (4) of 
Table 4 to control for the contemporaneous levels of these variables18. We report modified 
                                                 
15 In case the CGE study is calibrated on a base year data set prior to credibly announcing a schedule of tariff rate 
decreases, the ex-ante semi-elasticities must be compared to the sum of the announcement effect and the 
implementation effect. Otherwise (i. e. if the base year data set contains already the announcement effect), the 
ex-ante semi-elasticity must be compared only to the ex-post semi-elasticity with respect to 2ittuw  . 
16 We know of no work in which investment is held constant, but government absorption is not.  
17 Note that the insignificance of investment implies that the logged savings rate (measured as investment over 
output) is also insignificant. 
18 Clearly, in the investment equation we only control for the level of government expenditure. 
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semi-elasticities when one of these variables is significant. For ready reference, we 
summarize the resulting semi-elasticities in Table 5: 
 
Table 5 
Estimated ex-post semi-elasticities 
 GDP Consumption  Investment  Imports 
controlling for 
level of  
Results for 2ittuw   
itlng  0.105 0.278 0.354 0.293 
itlninv  and itlng  0.105 0.278 -- 0.200 
neither 0.105 0.278 0.516 0.293 
 Results for 1ittw   
itlng  0.459 0.974 1.211 0 
itlninv  and itlng  0.459 0.974 -- 0 
neither 0.459 0.974 1.387 0 
 
We will now compare these ex-post semi-elasticities with the semi-elasticities implied 
by the ex-ante projections of CGE studies. 
 
5. CGE based semi-elasticities and their econometric counterparts 
This section examines CGE studies which simulate trade liberalization measures for 
SMPCs. We use data and information reported in each paper to calculate what was, at the 
time of writing, an ex-ante perspective on the semi-elasticities of main macroeconomic 
variables19 with respect to quantitative import barriers in the partner countries. In the 
following section, these figures will be compared with the econometric estimates20.  
                                                 
19 These are: private consumption, investment, government expenditure, imports and FDI. 
20 While the details of trade liberalization scenarios as specified in the AAs are quite complex, most CGE studies 
include (or even focus on) a scenario of abolishing tariffs vis-à-vis the EU in manufacturing only. To ensure 
maximum comparability, we use results from this (benchmark) scenario whenever possible. Otherwise we use the 
scenario closest to the benchmark. We implicitly scale the results using the appropriate volume-based weights by 
calculating how the reduction of tariffs (for EU products, say) translates to a reduction of the overall average tariff 
rate by weighing with the appropriate share of EU trade. We calculate the semi-elasticities with respect to this 
average tariff rate to make them consistent with the definition of the regressors used in the econometric analysis. 
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Results of CGE studies may crucially depend on certain assumptions built into the 
model. These properties (e. g. small open economy or world economy assumption, static, 
sequential or dynamic models, perfect or imperfect competition, full employment or 
fluctuations in factor usage, assumptions on factor mobility, production technology, current 
account balance, exchange rate regime etc.) are suppressed to save space, but are 
available in the Web-appendix.  
These CGE studies deliver ex ante estimates of semi-elasticities, documented in detail 
in the Excel sheets on the paper’s web page and the discussion paper version of this article. 
The econometric results of the preceding section can be used to construct analogous 
estimates ex-post. In doing so, a number of issues merit attenion. First, the most prominent 
measure in CGE analysis is welfare. Unfortunately, welfare projections are hard to falsify. 
Econometrically, semi-elasticities for GDP, consumption, investment and imports are much 
more rewarding objects, but many CGE studies do not bother to report comprehensive 
results for these variables.  
Second, the econometric estimates in the preceding section condition on the level of 
lagged endogenous variables. Hence, the estimated semi-elasticities must be thought of as 
short-run elasticities. Static CGE models are typically silent on their horizon in real time, but 
since capital is held constant, the short-run econometric estimate is the appropriate 
counterpart. For sequential and dynamic models, the situation is more protracted. If these 
models report the values of macro variables in the new steady state, we compare the implied 
semi-elasticity to the short-run semi-elasticity from the econometric estimate divided by 
ˆ1  , where ˆ  is the estimated coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable(s). If 
simulation results are given for a finite simulation period of n years, we multiply the short-run 
semi-elasticity from the econometric estimate by    1ˆ ˆ1 1n   .  
Third, CGE models make different exogeneity assumptions. If (in the simulations) 
government expenditure is held fixed we use econometric estimates from regressions 
controlling for government expenditures. We proceed analogously for investment. Finally, in 
line with our theoretical analysis, we compute the semi-elasticity based on both the 
announcement and the implementation effect if the CGE model is calibrated to a benchmark 
data set prior to signing the AA, while otherwise we use only the estimate of the 
implementation effect.  
The right block of columns of Table 6 displays the results of these computations, while 
the left block of columns contains the CGE-based counterparts. This allows a ready 
comparison between ex ante and ex post measures of the macroeconomic effects of BI-
induced trade liberalization.  
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Ideally, ex ante and ex post semi-elasticities in Table 6 should be fairly close because 
econometric estimates account for changes in the economic environment by appropriate 
choice of conditioning regressors and hence isolates the effects of changes in the tariff 
structure in principle in the same way as a CGE analysis does. 
 
Table 6 
 
Semi-elasticities computed from  
 
 CGE studies  Econometric estimates 
Model GDP C I IM  GDP C I IM 
E2 0.741  1.856 3.425 0.564 0.000 1.565 0.293
E3 0.205 -0.103 0.617 2.987 1.930 3.002 3.931 0.557
E4 0.347 -0.108 1.071 1.975 1.930 3.002 3.931 0.557
E6 0.116  0.564       
E7   0.252       0.200
E9   0.244       0.200
E10 -0.130  0.944 0.105     0.200
J4 -0.001  -0.002 0.564     0.293
J5 -0.045 1.096 0.501 1.028 0.105 0.278 0.516 0.293
L1 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.105 0.278 0.354 0.293
L2 0.775 0.354 0.857 0.452 1.938 3.002 3.333 0.557
L3   0.064       0.293
M2  0.080 -1.149 0.148   0.278 0.516 0.293
M3 -0.307  6.491 0.105     0.200
S2 0.011 0.003 0.065 0.142 0.564 1.252 1.903 0.293
S3 0.015 0.006 0.054 0.084 0.564 1.252 1.903 0.293
S4 1.360 1.020 1.700 1.938 1.252 3.932   
S5 -0.031 0.707 -0.072 2.357 0.564 1.252 1.903 0.293
T3   1.789       0.200
T4   1.465       0.293
T5 0.096 -0.908 4.060 7.595 0.564 1.252 1.903 0.293
T7 1.016   0.105       
CGE Studies on SMPCs: Egypt: E1: Augier and Gasiorek (2003); E2: Bayar (2001); E3, E4: Dessus and Suwa-
Eisenmann (1998a, 1988b); E5: Hoekman and Konan (1998); E6: Konan and Kim (2004); E7,E8: Konan and 
Maskus (1996,2000); E9: Maskus and Konan (1997); E10: McDonald et al. (2006); Jordan: J1: Augier and 
Gasiorek (2003); J2: Feraboli et al. (2003); J3: Feraboli, O. (2007), J4: Hosoe (2001); J5: Lucke and Lucke 
(2001); Lebanon: L1: Dessus and Ghaleb (2008); L2: Lucke et al. (2007); L3: Martin (2000); Morocco: M1: Augier 
and Gasiorek (2003); M2: Bayar (2001); M3: Mc Donald et al. (2006); M4: Rutherford (1997); Syria: S1: Augier 
and Gasiorek (2003); S2, S3; Chemingui and Dessus (2004, 2008); S4: Gaitan and Lucke (2007); S5: Lucke and 
Lucke (2001); Tunisia: T1: Augier and Gasiorek (2003); T2: Bayar (2001); T3: Brown et al. (1996); T4: Chatti 
(2003); T5: Chemingui and Thabet (2008); T6: Cockburn et al. (1998); T7: Konan and Kim (2004); T8: Konan and 
Maskus (2004). CGE models not listed here lack results for macroaggregates. 
 
Unfortunately, Table 6 shows that the ex ante and ex post assessments of BI–induced 
trade liberalization are very much at odds with each other. To see this, a quick look at the 
deviations (henceforth denoted DEV(X) for variable X) between CGE-based and 
econometrically estimated semi-elasticities is revealing. As the descriptive statistics in Table 
7 make very clear, not only is the standard deviation of these deviations tremendous for all 
macro aggregates, but, possibly worse, the deviations seem to be systematically biased: 
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CGE-based assessments for effects on GDP, consumption, and investment seem to be 
systematically smaller than their econometric counterparts, while the reverse is true for 
imports. (Observe that the means of the deviations are significantly nonzero for all four types 
of deviations).  
 
Table 7 
 
Descriptive statistics for deviations between ex ante and ex post semi-elasticities 
 
 DEV(GDP) DEV(C) DEV(I) DEV(IM) 
mean 
(t-stat.) 
-0.50 
(-3.17) 
-1.27 
(-3.19) 
-1.34 
(-2.98) 
1.34 
(2.81) 
std. dev. 0.63 1.32 1.56 2.13 
minimum -1.73 -3.11 -3.31 -0.30 
maximum 0.91 0.82 2.16 7.30 
% observ. <0 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.65 
 
 
Unless there is a fundamental flaw in our econometric analysis, these results suggest 
that CGE modelling may be a very unreliable and possibly worthless way to assess the 
effects of trade liberalization policies. Of course, further analysis is required before such a 
far-reaching conclusion might be drawn. On the one hand, one might argue that Table 7’s 
results are due to a number of qualitatively minor CGE studies, while other, better-designed 
studies have delivered useful projections. On the other hand, one might also object that 
some countries among the SMPCs are particularly difficult to model, either because data 
quality is low or because their governments pursue economic policies more or less far off the 
free market paradigm on which most CGE models are based. 
We will therefore test if either inappropriate design of CGE studies or the analysis of 
certain “difficult” countries may explain the enormous deviations between ex ante and ex 
post assessments. To this end, we use standard ANOVA techniques. To capture differences 
in the modeling design, we define a number of variables as follows: 
DSMOPEC = 1, if small open economy model, 0 if not. 
DSTATIC = 1, if static model, 0 if not. 
DPERFCOMP = 1, if perfect competition, 0, if imperfect competition, 0.5 if competition is 
                               perfect on some and imperfect on other markets. 
DFULLEMP = 1, if full employment, 0, if flexible employment, 0.5, if employment is fixed on  
                            some markets but fluctuates on others. 
DFACMOB = 1, if all factors are fully mobile across sectors, 0, if not. 
DCA = 1, if current account zero, 0, if not. 
DGEX = 1, if government expenditure is exogenously fixed, 0, if not 
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DIEX = 1; if private investment is exogenously fixed, 0, if not.   
DCALI = 1, if base year precedes signing of AA, 0, if not  
 
Moreover, we define country fixed effects variables DJOR, DLEB, DMOR, DSYR, 
DTUN to single out countries for which CGE analysis might be more or less difficult than for 
the default country, Egypt.  
We first check if large deviations between ex ante and ex post semi-elasticities are due 
to the design or the target country of specific studies. For this purpose, we regress the 
absolute values of their deviations on the dummy variables defined above. We run separate 
regressions for the absolute values of DEV(GDP)and DEV(IM). For consumption and 
investment, however, we have only few observations, so we combine these in a single 
regression, i. e. we also use the absolute value of DEV(C,I) as dependent variable. ANOVA 
results are given in Table 8, where we display only those variables which are found 
significant in any of the regressions. 
Looking at 2R , it turns out that between 60% and 90% of the variance can be attributed 
to either country-specific factors or to the design of the studies. Syria and Tunisia seem to be 
countries more difficult to study than the average, while the converse is true for Jordan and 
Lebanon. Static models seem to yield more reliable projections than dynamic models and 
assuming elements of imperfect competition apparently increases the quality of forecasts for 
the GDP, consumption and investment. For imports, the small open economy assumption 
seems to work better than a model with simultaneous changes elsewhere in the environment 
and assuming restrictions on factor mobility seems to be counterproductive. Finally, CGE 
studies calibrated to data sets prior to signinig the AA are prone to relatively high errors. This 
finding makes sense since CGE models typically assess merely the implementation effect 
but not the announcement effect.  
Thus, specifics of the design or the target country of CGE studies may partially be 
responsible for the quality of the CGE projections. However, since the constant terms are 
large and significantly positive in two of the three regressions, the fundamental problem is 
not resolved: CGE studies do not seem to be very reliable in the light of econometric 
evidence. In fact, given the results from Table 8, we can now control for a number of adverse 
influences on particular CGE studies and can hence pose the central question more 
specifically: How reliable is a CGE-based assessment of trade liberalization policies, if the 
CGE study is well-designed and devoted to a country of average difficulty in terms of data 
quality, market strucutre and economic policy? By controlling for the regressors found 
significant in the ANOVA analysis, we can answer this question in a simple regression of the 
ex ante assessment of a CGE model (semi-elasticities from Table 6 for variable X are 
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denoted CGE(X)) on the ex post econometric counterpart (denoted ESTIM(X)). Ideally, then, 
the regression coefficient of estim should equal one.  
 
Table 8: 
 
ANOVA results for absolute value of deviations 
  
 Dependent variable:  
 
 abs(DEV(GDP)) 
 
abs(DEV(C,I)) 
 
abs(DEV(IM)) 
 
0.595 0.578 5.873 Constant 
0.039 0.201 0.000 
 -1.113  DJOR  0.043  
-0.491   DLEB 0.030   
0.238   DSYR 0.042   
0.358  3.302 DTUN 0.020  0.001 
-1.323 -1.301  DSTATIC 0.000 0.001  
1.059 2.252  DPERFCOMP 0.001 0.000  
  -4.683 DFACMOB   0.002 
  -3.194 DSMOPEC   0.002 
  1.913 DCALI   0.019 
2R  0.892 0.607 0.616 
Bold: Significant regression coefficients. Italics: P-values.  
 
 
Table 9: 
 
Regressing CGE(X) on ESTIM(X) and controls from Table 8 
  
 Dependent variable CGE(X):  
 
 CGE(GDP) 
 
CGE(C,I) 
 
CGE(IM) 
 
-0.816 -0.335 -1.501 ESTIM(X) 
0.016 0.315 0.601 
2R  0.356 -0.004 0.634 
Bold: Significant regression coefficients. Italics: P-values.  
 
 18
The results of this exercise, given in Table 9, are quite revealing. Even when 
controlling for possible sources of errors, CGE-based assessments of trade 
liberalization have no reasonable relationship with the econometric evidence. In fact, 
rather than being positive and equal to one, the estimated coefficient is negative for 
all three regressions, it is insignificant in two of the regressions and even significantly 
negative in the regression for GDP. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Summing up, we find strong and robust econometric evidence for positive effects of BI-
induced trade liberalization. GDP, consumption, investment and imports respond positively to 
lower tariff rates and they do so not only for implemented tariff changes but also in response 
to credible announcements of future trade liberalization.  
These results are highly relevant from a policy perspective. Not only do lower 
applicable tariff rates stimulate growth of GDP, consumption and investment, but the mere 
(credible) announcement of lower rates of protection promotes economic activity. In fact, the 
announcement effect is considerably stronger than the implementation effect, i. e. a 
discretionary change in tariff rates is not as effective as a binding commitment to decrease 
tariffs over a longer time horizon. Prior to the Barcelona Initiative, tariff policy was often 
intransparent and seemingly arbitrary in MENA countries. Our results underline that a shift to 
a systematic and foreseeable policy is of key importance for economic success, cf. Baldwin 
(2009). It is also noteworthy that FDI does not seem to react at all to discretionary tariff rate 
changes but only to the credible pledge to engage in a systematic and long-lasting policy of 
trade liberalization. 
Moreover, for GDP, consumption and investment the stimulating effects of trade 
liberalization are on average stronger than projected ex ante. Hence policymakers should be 
encouraged to adopt more open policies, even if consultants working with CGE models do 
not expect much potential. Policymakers need to take into account that an economy reacts in 
a dynamic and multifaceted way to liberalization, changing features of an economy which 
formal model projections may falsely assume as constant.  
For example, technology, markets and their degree of competition is fixed in CGE 
models, while it seems reasonable to expect that opening a country to foreign trade 
introduces new ideas, increases competition, and opens new markets and profit 
opportunities. We have found some support for the conjecture that CGE models fare better if 
they allow for imperfect competition, so that opening up may endogenously increase 
competition in these models. We have also found that assuming full factor mobility across 
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sectors improves CGE projections, which seems plausible if we interpret factor movements 
between existing markets as capturing at least part of the factor movements to newly 
developping markets that are likely to happen in reality.  
From the point of view of economic policy this implies that the potential for economic 
growth can be greatly enhanced by a broad approach to liberalize the economy – or at least 
not oppose changes which go along with more openness, cf. Tanzi (2004). Policymakers 
should support and foster market dynamics by deregulating product and labor markets. 
Moreover, since estimated semi-elasticities are considerably larger for investment than for 
consumption, we conjecture that supply-side effects are an important channel stimulating the 
economy. Static CGE models ignore these effects and thus underestimate the growth 
potential of policies aimed at opening up and liberalizing a developing economy.  
Interestingly, ex-ante projections overestimate the response of imports while 
underestimating the responses of GDP, consumption and investment. The reason for the 
former is likely due to overly optimistic calibration: The elasticities of substitution between 
domestic and imported commodities are usually an arbitrary choice of the modeller. Neither 
can they be derived from the benchmark data set using familiar calibration techniques, nor 
are they typically the result of serious econometric estimation. Rather, the choice of a 
particular value is often merely justified by the fact that similar values have been used in 
other studies - without digging any further. If the modeller wants to get something interesting 
out of his model, he may be tempted to choose relatively high elasticities of import demand 
to get his model going. 
Overall, CGE assessments of the likely macroeconomic effects of the Barcelona 
Initiative seem to have been very unreliable in the sense that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the ex ante assessments and the econometric evidence 
derived more or less ex post. This, as already mentioned in the introduction, is not meant to 
discard CGE analysis completely, since the ability of CGE models to project developments 
on a highly disaggregated basis may nevertheless be very useful. But since the CGE-based 
macro projections are just the aggregate of sectoral projections, it is clear that some rather 
fundamental problem must be present in the latter, too.  
For instance, CGE analysis has often stressed the fiscal costs of lower tariff rates. Our 
analysis does not support this view. Government consumption is on average unaffected by 
trade liberalization (and debt levels in the Mediterranean are low), so that we reach a 
reassuring conclusion for policymakers in favor of liberalization: The growth stimulus on the 
macroeconomy is large enough to compensate the government budget for loss of tariff 
revenue by increased revenue elsewhere in the growing economy. Here again, policymakers 
should not be scared away by ex-ante projections derived from CGE models. Rather, 
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consultants should use econometric evidence from countries which opened up earlier to 
convince the government of the prospects of trade liberalization and accompanying 
economic policies. 
While we must caution that data limitations and the fairly low standards of 
documentation in the CGE literature leave plenty of caveats to our analysis, we are confident 
that we have worked as throroughly and as carefully as possible without finding any evidence 
which would support the view that CGE analysis is worth the effort. This is bad news also for 
ourselves, as some of the studies we have reviewed are our own. If the reader is concerned 
that we may have had vested interests she may find it reassuring that the result we present 
is certainly in the opposite direction.   
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